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A single hospital admission can deplete household resources so considerably as to induce impoverishment,
especially in the Indian context of low government healthcare expenditure. Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
(RSBY) was a national health insurance scheme for below-poverty-line Indian families, to provide improved
access to hospitalization and greater financial protection via a public-private-partnership employing private
sector implementation capacity. Study objectives were to understand governance (including regulatory) en-
vironment and contract arrangements; evaluate expansion of services to beneficiaries; and assess compliance of
providers and user satisfaction. A case study approach in two districts met the need for in-depth information on
scheme functioning, and RSBY implementation was examined between 2011 and 13 in Patiala (Punjab) and
Yamunanagar (Haryana). Methods included 20 key stakeholder interviews, analysis of secondary datasets on
beneficiaries and claims, primary data collection in 31 public and private hospitals and in greater depth in 12
hospitals, and an exit survey of 751 patients. Enrolled and non-enrolled hospitals were mapped in each district
and service availability of enrolled hospitals assessed; enrollee characteristics were analysed; for the 12 hospi-
tals, information was obtained on structural quality and process of care, and patient satisfaction and out-of-
pocket payments.
The Indian states and the government of India did not specify formal regulatory and implementation pro-
cedures in detail and states largely contracted out their functions to private insurance firms. Findings show
regulatory weaknesses, and contractual breaches. Enrolment rates were low in both districts and more so for
Patiala and there was limited access to services. There was little difference in process of care between public and
private hospitals, though the structural capacity of private hospitals was better than public hospitals. RSBY
helped improve accessibility and gave some degree of financial protection to patients. It also actively engaged
with existing resources in the Indian health care and insurance markets.
1. Introduction
New Public Management (NPM) has been a dominant paradigm in
the discipline of public administration (Arora, 2003), encouraging po-
licies which have included market orientation of public services, con-
tracting out, and privatization (Kalimullah et al., 2012). Public-Private-
Partnerships (PPPs) have been an area of particular interest, as a new
tool for supporting public service provision. The Government of India
(GoI), since the economic liberalization reforms of 1980s, envisions
significant untapped potential for the use of a PPP model in the health
sector and has developed enabling tools and activities to encourage
private sector investment and engagement (Government of India,
2011).
India's general government health expenditure to GDP ratio is about
1% (2015–16) or about 25% of total health expenditure, amongst the
lowest in the world. Out-of-pocket expenditure amounts to nearly 65%,
one of the highest rates globally (World Health Organization, 2018;
World Bank, 2018). One-time high expenditure can deplete household
resources so considerably as to induce impoverishment (NSS, 2015).
To help redress this situation, the Government of India adopted a
health insurance programme called Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
(RSBY) in 2008. The RSBY was a national health insurance scheme
launched by the Ministry of Labour and Employment (MoLE) for below
poverty line (BPL) families in the informal sector, to improve access to
hospitalization and ensure greater financial protection from financial
liabilities arising out of health problems that involved hospitalization.
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Every BPL family, on paying INR 30 annually (US$ 0.62 at 2008 ex-
change rate), was given a biometric-enabled smart card containing their
fingerprints and photographs. The enrolment made accessible more
than 700 inpatient health-care procedures to a value of INR 30000 per
year per family (US$ 625).
States selected into implementing the scheme; the premium was
approximately INR 800 per family, with the federal government con-
tributing 75% and the participating state the rest. The scheme involved
a multitude of stakeholders from both public and private sectors and
was based on a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) model, governed by
contractual agreements. Key private stakeholders were insurance firms
who bid for the contracts (specifying the value of the household pre-
mium they would require) and were responsible for scheme im-
plementation such as empanelment, enrolment and awareness genera-
tion, and claim settlement; Third Party Administrators (TPAs) who
supported insurance firms in scheme implementation - primarily in
enrolment and claim settlement; and private hospitals who provided
care (along with public hospitals) and claimed reimbursement ac-
cording to a schedule of case-based fees.
The Indian health sector has for long had a large and vibrant private
sector presence - both formal and informal. Although similar proce-
dures in the private sector are about four times costlier than in the
public sector, a majority of cases are treated in the private sector (NSS,
2015). Private insurance firms have a significant presence, with in-
surance regulatory authorities in 2000 framing regulation regarding
registration of insurance firms and protection of policyholders' inter-
ests. Limited NGO and state health insurance has existed for some time.
The choice of a PPP model and use of private as well as public hospitals
in RSBY can be understood in the light of the goal to rapidly scale up
coverage, making use of both the management capacity as well as the
hospital capacity present in the private sector. Although many health
systems make use of the private sector for delivery of care, the reliance
of RSBY on insurance firm intermediaries rather than public govern-
ance structures is unusual. Thus, it is of considerable interest to ex-
amine in-depth how well RSBY's implementation mechanisms func-
tioned given the PPP framework and the aim to increase accessibility to
hospitalization and financial protection.
Literature from middle and low-income countries strongly suggests
that critical influences on the success of contractual arrangements in-
clude capacities of both purchasers and providers, ability to assert
control over contract compliance, and the functioning of overall gov-
ernance including the regulatory framework (Mills, 1998). Moreover,
literature has also noted that social health insurance in India is difficult
to implement given its large informal sector, lack of cohesion and so-
lidarity, and poor institutional capacity (Rao, 2005), and that private
sector regulation is poor (Peters and Muraleedharan, 2008). Hence, the
objectives of this study, conducted in 2011–12, focused on describing
and analysing RSBY's governance (including regulatory) environment
and contract terms; evaluating expansion of provision of care to bene-
ficiaries; and assessing compliance of providers with the scheme and
user satisfaction.
Our assessment is particularly important and timely as the PPP
framework of RSBY has been adopted for Ayushman Bharat Yojana
launched in 2018 and into which RSBY has been subsumed.
2. Materials and methods
Limited nation-wide data were available to examine RSBY con-
tractual arrangements, and an in-depth study would not have been
feasible on a large scale. Case studies of the implementation of RSBY
were done in two districts, Patiala and Yamunanagar, in the adjacent
States of Punjab and Haryana. These areas have both common and
contrasting features, allowing for a focused analysis of the RSBY im-
plementation process. They are near Delhi, one of the richer cities in
Fig. 1. Conceptual Framework, TPA – third party administrator; NGO – non-governmental organization; SHG – self-help group; PPP – public-private partnership.
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India, and have similar culture, level of economic development, po-
pulation, and state government size. The states incorporated the pro-
gramme at the same time, had greater than two years of implementa-
tion at the start of the study and buy-in to the study from various
stakeholders. Given that RSBY was initiated by the federal Ministry of
Labour and Employment (and subsequently passed to the Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare), an important contrasting feature was that
governance responsibility was assigned in Punjab to the state Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW), and in Haryana to the Ministry
of Labour and Employment (MoLE).
Fig. 1 provides the conceptual framework and indicates that im-
plementation of RSBY involved insurance firms, TPAs, NGOs, self-help
groups (SHGs) and private and public providers with contractual rela-
tions specifying roles and responsibilities for providing services to RSBY
beneficiaries. The methods and data needed for the study were identi-
fied by systematically thinking through how RSBY was intended to
function given its desired aims and implementing arrangements, and -
given lessons from the international and Indian literature on challenges
with PPPs, contracts, and the private sector - what critical elements
needed to be in place for the aims to be achieved. Elements considered
critical included aspects of the environment (e.g. governance structure),
design (e.g. sufficiently specified contract terms) and operation (e.g.
compliance of hospitals with contractual requirements). Mixed methods
involving both primary and secondary data collection were used to
study governance (including regulatory) arrangements, contract terms,
availability of services for the insured, hospital compliance with con-
tract terms and service delivery, and user satisfaction with hospital care
received. The study was conducted between 2011 and 2013; Fig. 2
details the tools used, and data obtained.
Semi-structured interviews of 20 key stakeholders and reviews of
key documents explored governance, regulatory and contract issues.
Stakeholders were identified through determining key figures that
would help implement RSBY at state and district levels. Policymakers at
central level were also interviewed as they had insights into how the
scheme was developed. To assess competition for the contracts, the
state nodal agency (SNA) of Punjab, responsible for scheme im-
plementation, provided the list of insurance companies who had par-
ticipated in the bidding process during 2008–12 (similar data were not
available for Yamunanagar).
Expansion of services for the insured was assessed through sec-
ondary analysis of the size and distribution of the BPL population, data
on beneficiary enrolment, a database of empaneled and non-empaneled
facilities, and a claims database covering one complete annual cycle of
enrolment, from September 2011 to December 2012 containing 992
claims from Patiala and 6,043 claims from Yamunanagar. ArcGIS®
mapping software was used to map health facilities in Patiala and
Yamunanagar. Primary data were collected by trained interviewers on
the availability at 31 empaneled hospitals of 20 services reflecting ca-
tegories defined under the list of package rates of RSBY.
Assessment of the quality of services followed the Donabedian
Framework (Donabedian, 1988, 2005) of structure, process, outcome,
and included aspects which reflected compliance with RSBY contract
terms:
1. Structure: Evaluation of all structural aspects of care (e.g. facilities,
equipment, staff) via a checklist completed by hospital staff.
2. Process: Evaluation of process of care via observations by trained
interviewers of the functioning of the various departments and of
facility records, and via information from an exit survey of patients,
covering patient time spent in the clinic, adequacy of waiting area,
patient privacy, etc.
3. Outcome: User satisfaction/perceived quality from the exit survey.
Impact on health outcomes was excluded from evaluation due to
resource constraints and measurement difficulty.
Twelve hospitals, three public and three private hospitals in each
district, were selected for this assessment of quality of care, in order to
obtain more detailed information. Factors influencing selection of the
facilities were (1) the volume of RSBY patients at the facility, and (2)
the management's willingness to participate. The exit survey used a
semi-structured, pre-tested questionnaire and trained interviewers to
obtain information from both RSBY and non-RSBY patients (in order to
explore differences between them) at discharge from hospital or during
follow-up visits. The intended sample size was 752, based on a case
control study design, with 95% confidence interval, 80% power, 20%
expected frequency of exposure (scheme implementation) in the control
group and 10% exposure among the cases. As patients left the selected
empaneled hospitals they were interviewed until the desired sample
size was reached in each facility and each group (i.e. RSBY or non-
RSBY). Exclusion criteria were enrolment in any other insurance
scheme, and patient refusal. 751 exit interviews were completed
(Figure A1)
Fig. 2. Tools used and data obtained in relation to study objectives.
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Questions covered patient characteristics, service delivery (in-
dicators of process and quality of care) and user satisfaction. Service
delivery included key aspects related to hospital compliance: RSBY help
desk; coverage of cost of treatment; diagnostics and medicines provi-
sion; provision of food and transportation services; post hospitalization
cover. To assess user satisfaction, a modified version was used of the
questions in the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers
and Systems (HCAHPS, 2012) questionnaire. Questions covered seven
categories: care during admission, care from nursing staff, care from
doctors, hospital environment, experiences in the hospital, care during
discharge and overall rating by beneficiaries.
The qualitative data from interviews and document review were
analysed using thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and trian-
gulated where possible. The analysis involved recognizing key themes
from documents and key-informant interviews. Quantitative data were
initially analysed using descriptive statistics and multivariate analysis
was undertaken when appropriate and feasible.
Ethical clearance was obtained from the Institutional Ethics
Committee at the London School of Hygiene (5968) and Tropical
Medicine and the Public Health Foundation of India (TRC-IEC-133/12).
3. Results
The governance framework driving the PPP arrangement was ex-
pected to affect the enrolment of eligible beneficiaries, the availability
and accessibility of the providers who were contracted to treat them,
and the services received by users. The results are thus organized
around four themes considered critical in influencing Scheme opera-
tion: (i) governance arrangements including regulatory mechanisms
and contractual framework (ii) contract terms (iii) expansion of services
through enrolment of beneficiaries and empanelment of service provi-
ders within the PPP framework and (iv) care received within the con-
tractual framework and the beneficiary perception of care.
3.1. Governance including regulatory arrangements
The governance framework is made up of the institutions which
enforce contracts with administrative implementers who find the en-
rollees, locate providers, make arrangements with providers and ensure
ongoing quality control. The arrangements are shaped by the general
political and regulatory framework within which most public pro-
grammes work.
Key informants and document review indicated that RSBY was an-
nounced a few months before the 2009 general elections by a govern-
ment eager to be seen as pro-poor and suggested that the scheme
content and implementation process may not have been well thought
through. Lessons in relation to regulation, implementation, monitoring,
etc. from similar insurance schemes within India such as the Universal
Health Insurance Scheme, and from other countries, were not in-
corporated in RSBY (Rao, 2005). As public healthcare delivery is a state
responsibility in India, the design of RSBY required political commit-
ment at the state level; which party was in power at the State level did
not affect scheme implementation.
Consistent with findings from other research and document reviews,
key informants indicated that the regulatory framework was weak,
particularly for private health facilities. Regulation of private facilities
was very limited and most likely went unenforced (Gupta and Rani,
2004; Peters and Muraleedharan, 2008). Despite a substantial presence
of private hospitals in the country, information regarding their number,
structure, functioning, type and quality of care was grossly inadequate
(Panning Commission, 2007). The Clinical Establishments Act was
passed in 2010 and notified by the union government in 2012, three
years after RSBY was introduced. All states were asked by the Ministry
of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) to adopt the law but only 9 of
29 states had done so by the end of 2014. The Indian Insurance Reg-
ulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) was the regulating body for
insurance companies and the TPAs. IRDA guidelines for insurance
companies and TPAs were mandatory, and compliance required ob-
taining a license to provide health insurance; hence insurance regula-
tion, unlike health provider regulation, was enforced.
Fig. 3. Central (A) and State (B) level Structures.
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No formal organizational structure supporting RSBY was specified,
and the actual arrangements at central level and in the two states are
shown in Fig. 3. No new bureaucracy was created to implement RSBY
and the central team was small. The existing structure of the Directorate
General Labour Welfare rolled out the scheme using the available
government functionaries who were assigned additional responsi-
bilities. RSBY was implemented by the Ministry of Labour and Em-
ployment, which was considered to lack the experience to implement a
health scheme of such complexity. Different state governments chose
different departments for placement of the State Nodal Agencies which
took responsibility for scheme implementation (Fig. 3 B). Punjab chose
the Health Systems Corporation (part of the Department of Health and
Family Welfare, Government of Punjab) and Haryana chose the Direc-
torate of Employees State Insurance Health Care within the Ministry of
Labour and Employment, Government of Haryana. These influenced the
nodal agencies designated at the district level: in Patiala it was the
Deputy Medical Commissioners and in Yamunanagar it was the civil
surgeon who was both the state nodal officer and also responsible for
the four adjoining districts. In general, key informants considered
human resources to be inadequate for implementation at state and
district levels. For example, no single position was dedicated to RSBY at
the state level.
Out of eight insurance companies who bid in Punjab for the RSBY
contract, ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company was selected.
Such bidding information was not available for Haryana, but the same
insurance company (ICICI) held the contract. The insurance company
had contracted one TPA in both districts to facilitate RSBY im-
plementation. This contract award was based on the TPA's reputation
with no bidding process.
Private and public providers were contracted to deliver services to
RSBY beneficiaries. In addition, other partners such as NGOs and self-
help groups assisted the insurance company in raising awareness of the
scheme. The majority of scheme implementation activities were un-
dertaken by insurance firms, with state governments mainly playing a
facilitating role.
3.2. Contract terms
Contracts under RSBY were standardized and all states used the
same contract. Important contracts were at three levels, between: (i) the
centre and state; (ii) the state and insurance company; and (iii) the
insurance company and service provider (Table 1). The contractual
agreement between the Central Government and the states was iden-
tical for Haryana and Punjab. Although there was room for innovation
and additional clauses in the Central Government's RSBY framework,
the states under study had not exercised that flexibility. The purpose of
the contract was clearly outlined to provide social security to the BPL
workers and their families in the unorganized sector. The contract
clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of both parties involved,
the Central Government and the SNA.
The contract between the state government and the insurance
company was the most comprehensive RSBY contract with details of
contract commencement, duration and termination clearly specified.
This contract was more detailed probably because the insurance com-
pany bore extensive responsibilities for scheme implementation.
A major gap in contract design was the monitoring strategy, which
was loosely stated in the contract and monitoring mechanisms and
parameters were not defined. There was no mention of resources re-
quired for monitoring and supervision at the district level. Further,
there was no mention of incentives for stakeholders to ensure effective
implementation and offer high quality of care.
3.3. Expansion of services
The PPP framework of RSBY was intended to enhance supply
through bringing in providers who previously would have been beyond
the economic reach of the beneficiaries. RSBY became the third-party-
payer through enrolling beneficiaries and giving them access to provi-
ders willing to provide specified packages of care at the lower-end of
market prices, specified as payment for procedures, yet nonetheless at
some acceptable level of care. Insurance firms were contracted to enroll
the beneficiaries and were responsible for empaneling service providers
to make care accessible.
Only 15% of the eligible (BPL) population was enrolled in the RSBY
scheme in Patiala district compared to 40% in Yamunanagar. Issues
such as errors in the list of eligible households and the annual process of
re-enrolment by the insurance companies are likely general explana-
tions for low enrolment rates. A specific reason for very low enrolment
in Patiala district, provided by a key informant, was that enrolment
overlapped the harvesting season which would have occupied many
potential beneficiaries, whereas enrolment in Yamunanagar was done
earlier.
The maximum number of individuals that could be enrolled per
family was five, but the average number enrolled per family was only
Table 1
Contract terms.
Contract terms Contracts between
Central & state government State & insurance company Insurance company & provider
Ownership of contracts stated (signing
authority)
yes (Director General Labor Welfare,
Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Government of India and the respective
state government)
yes (Department of Health & Family Welfare,
Government of Punjab through State nodal
agency and ICICI Lombard General Insurance
company)
yes (ICICI Lombard General
Insurance company and
empaneled hospitals)
Objectives of contract stated (to provide social
security to the BPL workers and their
families in the unorganized sector)
yes yes yes
Length (duration) of the contract stated none yes (one year) yes (one year)
Payment mechanism specified yes (75% by central government and 25%
by the state government)
yes (electronically according to 64VB or IRDA
act)
yes (electronically)
Roles & responsibilities of stakeholders stated yes (Central government and state
government specific roles were defined)
yes (State nodal agency and Insurance
company roles were clearly defined)
yes (Roles of insurance company
and Health care provider were
defined in the contract)
Empanelment criteria of providers specified none yes (empanelment criteria or the healthcare
provider was stated)
NA
Statement of monitoring mechanisms for
contract implementation
none none none
Specification of sanctions none (not expected in a federal system) yes (contract could be terminated) yes (contract could be terminated)
Explicit incentives for effective scheme
implementation
none (not expected in a federal system) none none
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3.25 (Patiala 2.37, Yamunanagar 3.56) although both states had
average household sizes of around 5.2. Low enrolment per family may
indicate moral hazard as the greater the household enrolment, the
higher the likely claims pay-out per family. Only in Patiala were age-
gender specific enrolment rates available (Table A1). A greater per-
centage of those of working age (15–64) were enrolled than other age
brackets with little gender difference. However, a slightly higher pro-
portion of men than women above 64 were enrolled: 31.9% and 22.4%.
Very few young people were enrolled, perhaps reflecting the fact that
various other health programmes are available for the young.
Contracts require insurance firms to enlist service providers who
would be available to the enrollees. The empanelment process was
based on prescribed criteria that the service providers need to possess,
such as specified basic facilities. For example, the service provider was
required to have at least 10 inpatient medical beds, and specified
medical, surgical and diagnostic facilities. The providers were re-
imbursed the fixed package rates for the services offered to the RSBY
beneficiaries through electronic transfer by the insurance companies. In
Patiala, the 10 empaneled public hospitals were distributed across the
state whereas the 7 empaneled private hospitals were geographically
clustered around pockets within the sub-district level (Fig. 4a). In Ya-
munanagar, very few public hospitals were empaneled (4); the 33
empaneled private sector hospitals were clustered around one sub-dis-
trict (Fig. 4b). There were a number of hospitals, both public and pri-
vate, dispersed around the districts that were not empaneled. Public
hospitals shown in Fig. 4 comprise Community Health Centres, and sub-
divisional and civil hospitals, which can be assumed to have the facil-
ities required for empaneling, but the same assumption cannot be made
for non-empaneled private hospitals.
An effective PPP arrangement should ensure that the entire package
of care as promised through RSBY should be accessible to the enrollees.
This was assessed through employing a checklist of service availability.
It was completed by only 12 of 17 empaneled hospitals in Patiala, and
19 of 37 in Yamunanagar (Table 2) due to refusals, consistent with the
reluctance of private hospitals to supply information to public autho-
rities referred to earlier. The services shown in the table are the broad
categories of all the packages under the RSBY scheme. Super-specialty
services such as cardiology, neurology, neurosurgery and urology were
minimal in RSBY-empaneled hospitals in both districts, and where
present, were mainly in the private hospitals. A few private hospitals in
Yamunanagar provided all services but no private hospitals did so in
Patiala. None of the public hospitals in either district provided all the
services covered by RSBY. Public hospitals in Patiala had only 50% of
potential services actually available, and Yamunanagar 78%; these
percentages were 63% and 64% for private hospitals, respectively.
Given missing data, these findings are indicative of limited service
availability rather than conclusive, though if anything they may over-
estimate service availability since smaller facilities are more likely to
have been omitted.
Information from the health provider checklist for the 12 hospitals
studied in detail showed that private hospitals scored better than public
hospitals under all categories of structural quality (Khetrapal, 2016).
This was confirmed by the Observation and Facility Record Checklist.
Insurance claims indicate how RSBY was used to access care
(Table 3). The number of claims per 1000 individuals enrolled under
the scheme, for the period of 14 months, was approximately 26 for
Patiala and 36 for Yamunanagar. In both districts, more claims per
hospital were made in private hospitals, suggesting that the private
hospitals may have been preferred or that public hospitals may not have
been fully engaged with RSBY, but there was no benchmark against
which the volume of claims could be assessed. Claims were clustered in
certain hospitals (measured through the Herfindahl Index, calculated
separately for private and public hospitals): in Patiala the claims were
significantly concentrated in certain private and public hospitals; in
Yamunanagar, in public hospitals only (Table 3).
The information in Fig. 4 and Table 2 on hospital distribution and
service availability suggests that not everyone would have been in easy
reach of an empaneled hospital and only a limited set of services were
often available, implying that not all empaneled hospitals were equally
desirable. The PPP design, although drawing on private hospital capa-
city, was unlikely to have been able to reduce fully travel distances and
the associated costs.
There was a large difference in mean claimed amount and re-
imbursed amount in Patiala (INR 4,134 or US$ 63) and virtually no
difference in Yamunanagar (Table A2). In Patiala, mean claimed
amounts were fairly similar between public and private hospitals, but a
higher share of public hospital claims was reimbursed, resulting in a
higher mean reimbursement to public than private hospitals. Mean
Fig. 4. Distribution of health facilities in Patiala (4a) and Yamunanagar (4b).
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claimed and reimbursed amounts in Yamunanagar were virtually
identical across public and private hospitals. It is possible that the
difference in the responsible state body for RSBY between the districts
may have influenced this pattern: the ministry of health in Patiala
might have been more restrictive in adjudicating claims than the min-
istry of labour in Yamunanagar. The actual mean amount paid per claim
was fairly similar across public hospitals in Patiala and both public and
private hospitals in Yamunanagar, with private hospitals in Patiala re-
ceiving a lower mean amount.
In both districts, most of the claims were made under the medically
managed disease (MMD) general package, followed by the ophthal-
mology package and MMD-ICU (Table 4). Almost all the claims cate-
gorized under ophthalmology and MMD-ICU were from private
Table 2
Availability of services within RSBY empaneled hospitals.
Patiala Yamunanagar
Public Private Total Public Private Total
Number of empaneled
hospitals
10 7 17 4 33 37
Number of hospitals which
returned the survey
5 7 12 2 17 19
Total No. of beds available 300 146 446 NA 205 (8)a NA
Mean No. of beds per hospital 60 21 37 NA 25.6 NA
Number of hospitals with the following services:
Neonatal care 4 6 10 2 15 17
Burns 3 3 6 2 6 8
Snake bite 3 3 6 2 12 14
Oncology 0 3 3 2 4 6
Urology 1 6 7 0 9 9
Endocrinology 0 2 2 0 13 13
Paediatrics 4 6 10 1 9 10
Orthopaedics 4 4 8 2 9 11
Ophthalmology 4 2 6 2 15 17
Neurosurgery 0 1 1 1 8 9
Hysteroscopy 0 4 4 0 7 7
Endoscopic procedures 0 6 6 1 12 13
Gynaecology 5 6 11 2 13 15
General surgery 5 7 12 2 12 14
ENT 3 3 6 2 8 10
Dental 4 2 6 2 9 11
Medical general ward – ICU 0 5 5 2 12 14
Medical general ward
–nonsurgical
5 7 12 2 14 16
Medical general ward –
surgical
5 7 12 2 16 18
Intensive care unit 0 5 5 2 13 15
Total possible types of care
(number of hospitals
times the number of
required types of
services)
100 140 240 40 340 380
Actual total care (total
number of services
available)
50 88 138 31 216 247
Percentage of services
actually available
50% 63% 58% 78% 64% 65%
a Only eight hospitals reported the number of beds available.
Table 3
Claims in Patiala and Yamunanagar (for a 14-month period).
Patiala Yamunanagar
Claims in 14 months 992 6043
Claims/month 70.9 431.6
Claims/facility/month 4.2 11.7
Claims/1000 population/month 1.85 2.6
Claims distribution in private and public hospitals
District Type of hospital No. of claims (%) No. of empaneled hospitals Average claims per hospital (Claims/total No. of empaneled hospitals)
Patiala Private 669 (67.4) 7 95.6
Public 323 (32.6) 10 32.3
Total 992 (100) 17 58.4
Yamunanagar Private 5,658 (93.6) 33 171.5
Public 385 (6.4) 4 96.3
Total 6,043 (100) 37 163.3
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexa of hospitals
Private hospitals Public hospitals Total
Patiala 3,058 3,468 1,758
Yamunanagar 1,078 5,222 967
a Interpretation: Below 1500 – un-concentrated; 1500–2500 – moderately concentrated; above 2500 – highly concentrated.
Table 4
Distribution of claims in both districts by service type.
Disease category Districts Hospital type (Both
Districts)
Patiala
n= 992
Yamunanagar
n= 6043
Private
n=6327
Public
n= 708
% % % %
No package listed 0.1 4.6 4.3 0.8
Dental 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ear 1.2 0.1 0.1 1.8
Endocrine 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
Endoscopic
procedures
0.9 2.2 2.1 1.1
General surgery 11.8 11.1 10.2 20.1
Gynaecology 11.5 6.3 6.4 12.4
Hysteroscopy 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0
MMD-general 44.9 31.7 32.1 46.6
MMD-ICU 19.3 14.0 16.3 0.0
Neurosurgery 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Nose 0.9 0.2 0.1 1.8
Oncology 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ophthalmology 3.4 18.9 18.1 4.8
Orthopaedic 4.3 7.0 6.5 8.2
Paediatric 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Throat 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Urology 1.2 3.2 3.1 1.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
MMD: medically-managed disease; ICU: Intensive Care Unit.
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hospitals. Claims under cancer ailments, endocrine and neurosurgery
were almost negligible in both districts, although they are among the
leading causes of hospitalization in India (NSS, 2015). There were very
few paediatric cases.
3.4. Compliance of providers and user satisfaction
Monitoring of service delivery (process quality of care) and in-
centives that encourage appropriate effort are a crucial part of the
success of any health scheme. PPP in health services is intended to
leverage market forces that may help ensure better services.
Compliance with the service contracts is strongly connected to what
should be expected from service providers and satisfaction with services
provided. Moreover, evidence on compliance of providers with contract
terms can indicate failure of monitoring.
Hospital compliance with contract requirements was assessed lar-
gely from the exit interviews through questions about the process of
service delivery (Table 5). Contract clauses specifically require, for
example, provision of food, medicines and diagnostic tests during the
hospital stay, reimbursement of transport costs, and coverage of post-
hospitalization services for five days. Variability in compliance was
observed for the various service delivery categories studied, though
Patiala seemed to perform better in most of these categories than Ya-
munanagar. For information provided to patients from the RSBY help
desk, Patiala was significantly better than Yamunanagar. Patiala also
performed better in terms of providing diagnostics and medicines, since
a smaller proportion of participants from Patiala were asked to obtain
them from outside the hospital. Neither district did well in providing
food to patients. Patiala performed better in terms of informing patients
on the balance of money left on the card, providing information about
post-hospitalization expenses, and reimbursing the transportation cost
in Patiala (whereas no patients reported being reimbursed in Yamu-
nanagar).
With regard to public and private hospitals, only slight differences
were observed for most categories, and compliance problems seemed
mainly to be common across both types of hospital. Private hospitals
were more likely than public hospitals to ask patients to get diagnostic
tests and medicines from outside the hospital, and less likely to re-
imburse transport costs.
Indeed, out-of-pocket expenditure from patients in private hospitals
was almost double that in public hospitals, both within each district and
across the districts (Khetrapal and Acharya, 2019). It was expected that
expenditures of RSBY beneficiaries would be significantly less than
those of non-RSBY members. This was the case in Patiala, however in
Yamunanagar, the difference was less pronounced. Insurance did not,
therefore, produce a large reduction in the actual cost borne by the
intended beneficiaries, in large part because of the preference for using
private hospitals.
Table 6 shows information on user satisfaction, by district, type of
hospital and RSBY and non-RSBY members. There was generally a high
level of satisfaction across all categories, as commonly reported in exit
surveys. While there were variations within and between aspects of
care, user satisfaction relating to care from nurses and doctors was
better among Patiala respondents when compared to Yamunanagar,
and the overall hospital rating was higher. Almost all aspects were rated
somewhat better in private facilities when compared to public facilities,
and the overall hospital rating was slightly higher for the former. User
satisfaction of RSBY participants was slightly higher on all aspects than
that of non-RSBY participants, though the latter's hospital rating was
slightly higher. Virtually all patients would recommend their hospital to
friends, regardless of its location or type.
4. Discussion
Understanding the consequences of contractual relationships is
challenging (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005), especially in the healthTa
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care sector where quality of care is difficult to assess. This study drew
on a mix of methods using primary and secondary data to shed light on
the operation of a PPP. However, data were incomplete regarding the
characteristics of the BPL population in Yamunanagar, and availability
of services for 23 RSBY empaneled hospitals who did not respond.
The study found that the scheme had been launched in a rush due to
the upcoming general elections in 2009; document review and key in-
formants suggested that this is consistent with findings that such
schemes are usually announced during the election time for political
gains (Thakur, 2015). Announcing or increasing fiscal expenditure for
social programmes for political ends at election cycles is well docu-
mented (Ebeke and Dölcer, 2013).
Most PPP literature emphasizes that governments must play a large
regulatory role if health care is to be delivered via private firms and
providers (Baru, 2013; Hart, 2016) and that strong regulatory, man-
agerial and information capacity is needed (Regional Committee for
Europe – WHO, 2002). Implementation of a PPP framework requires
significant government effort due to the need for strong regulation.
(Regional Training Institute, 2014).
Findings show regulatory weaknesses, including significant con-
tractual breaches such as lack of information given to beneficiaries
about packages and location of hospitals, non-reimbursement of
transportation cost, unavailability of food, and providers not sharing
information with beneficiaries. Neither states nor the central govern-
ment laid down specific implementation and regulatory procedures in
states. The capitation payment per household seems to have been
awarded automatically to the state then subsequently to the insurance
firms, without much subsequent monitoring. Similar findings have also
been observed in other studies on RSBY (Das and Leino, 2011; RSBY
Committee, 2014; Seshadri et al., 2011). A stronger regulatory system
may have questioned, for example, the low enrolment rate per family.
The principal, GoI, designed the institutional framework, however
health is a state subject thus strong state capacity was key to smooth
implementation, and state governments should serve as the primary
custodian and stakeholder of the scheme. Instead, the states had largely
contracted out their functions to private insurance firms without much
attention to designing incentives that would ensure they operated in the
public good.
The study provided the opportunity to explore the implications of
different governance structures at state level. Results suggest that the
Department of Health in Punjab was better in terms of service delivery,
transportation reimbursement, higher empanelment of public facilities
and overall user satisfaction, which was 7.9 (out of 10) in Patiala, and
5.5 in Yamunanagar (Table 6). However, the Department of Labour and
Employment in Haryana achieved higher enrolment of beneficiaries,
greater empanelment of hospitals, and a higher rate of use of hospitals
(as assessed though the claims rate, Table 3). Key stakeholders inter-
viewed felt that it was easier to work with the Health Department than
the Labour Department, and the latter may have lacked the expertise to
deliver health services to the BPL population as health was not their
prime responsibility.
Enrolment rates were low in both districts and more so for Patiala as
compared to Yamunanagar, both in terms of percentage of households
covered and those enrolled within a household, and this finding is
consistent with studies of voluntary enrolment in other settings, for
example Vietnam (Wagstaff, 2007). Other studies have raised concerns
regarding the quality of information, education and communication
(IEC) activities undertaken to promote RSBY (Trivedi and Saxena,
2013; Mahadevia, 2012). Given the poor regulatory and monitoring
mechanisms, a low level of IEC should be expected from the agent.
Principal agent theory suggests that agents in a PPP relationship will
reduce costs (with implications for quality) when payments are based
on per unit payment (Hart, 2016).
As suggested above, the difference in enrolment rates between the
districts might be related to their different regulatory environments.
The MoHFW (in Patiala) may not have been as efficient as the MoLE (in
Yamunanagar) in identifying and enrolling those in the informal sector.
Adverse selection was not evident in the scheme at least in terms of age-
group enrolled, as the enrolment rate was higher for those above 25
years and poor for those below 15 years. Adverse selection is less likely
in social health insurance schemes when there are no significant en-
rolment charges for the eligible group (Belli, 2001).
Although RSBY was intended to increase access to services for the
poor, the distribution of empaneled hospitals indicated that there was
likely to have been inadequate access to services in some areas.
Literature shows that non-availability of RSBY empaneled hospitals has
meant lower scheme utilization in some areas (Health Inc Consortium,
2014). In this study, public hospitals were more equitably distributed
throughout the districts than private facilities, which were geo-
graphically clustered around pockets at the sub-district level, and not
all public hospitals were empaneled. Such an observation raises ques-
tions on the empanelment criteria of the scheme. Similar findings have
been reported from other states such as Karnataka (Rajasekhar et al.,
2011). There could be several reasons for not empaneling available
hospitals. Misalignment of incentives might be a plausible reason where
insurance companies empaneled fewer hospitals in order to limit ac-
cessibility and thus minimize claims to increase their profit. Other
studies have shown that insurance companies have tried to suspend or
de-empanel hospitals for small infractions, and even for unintentional
mistakes (Khurana and Dave, 2016). Administrative staff might also be
poorly informed and not proactive, as was observed in Chhattisgarh
(Council Of Tribal And Rural Development, 2013). However, it needs to
be recognised that the number of hospitals in rural areas is small, and
these hospitals may not all meet the eligibility criteria of empanelment;
hence it is likely that the majority of empaneled hospitals will be in
urban areas. The result is that rural populations have to travel long
distances to access services.
The majority of claims were for private care. A preference for using
private care (as noted above), previously unaffordable, probably re-
flects the general notion in India that the private sector offers better
care. Further, clustering was seen (beneficiaries going more to certain
hospitals) in both districts. Certain hospitals may develop a reputation
over time because of the quality of services they provide. The scheme
has enabled the poor to choose a hospital based on their preference
which may have resulted in many beneficiaries choosing the most re-
puted hospital of the district. Under a PPP arrangement there is no
built-in mechanism other than patient demand or choice that would
induce a greater number of hospitals to offer more services.
In Patiala, there was a greater difference between claimed and re-
imbursed amounts than in Yamunanagar. Further, this difference was
higher for private than public hospitals. The average number of claims
per hospital was lower in Patiala because of the lower level of enrol-
ment accompanied by a lower utilization rate. It might be speculated
that such circumstances may have led providers to inflate the claim
amount to achieve a desired level of profit from the limited number of
cases reimbursable through RSBY. In Yamunanagar, the average
number of cases per hospital was relatively high; it is possible that
meeting a profit target from the volume of the claims was perhaps
easier, thus reducing the incentive to inflate claims.
Interestingly, the study detected little difference in service delivery
(process of care) between public and private sectors. Thus, study results
appear contrary to the general presumption (although contentious) that
the private sector offers superior care compared to the public sector
(Das and Hammer, 2007), though structural quality was indeed re-
ported to be higher in private hospitals. We found that RSBY, despite its
PPP design, was not able to ensure access to all the types of care that the
scheme had intended, though it did provide access to the private sector.
We cannot confirm or refute that the PPP model produced good quality
care in all aspects.
RSBY participants reported slightly better satisfaction when com-
pared to non-RSBY participants. There could be two possible explana-
tions for this. Firstly, as the assessment of hospital quality of care was
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self-reported, RSBY beneficiaries who previously lacked access may
have been grateful for the facilities provided to them, regardless of
whether they met recognised quality standards. Similar observations
have been made for Vietnam (Wagstaff, 2007). Indeed, RSBY bene-
ficiaries reported greater satisfaction than non-RSBY participants for
aspects of care that would not have differed based on source of payment
(e.g. cleanliness). The second possible explanation is in line with find-
ings of Devadasan et al., that the insurance scheme might have nego-
tiated a higher quality of care for its members (Devadasan et al., 2011).
However, we found no evidence that there was such negotiation.
The evidence of substantial patient expenditure (at times nearly
equal to that of the uninsured) is consistent with findings from other
countries with regard to health insurance schemes for the poor
(Acharya et al., 2012). The RSBY insurance scheme, an example of a
PPP, was designed to take advantage of provider pluralism, but it is
important to note that giving access to the private sector induced higher
patient costs than were incurred in public hospitals. Consistent with the
findings from the National Sample Survey, most OOP expenditure was
related to drugs and diagnostics (NSS, 2015), and patients' reported
expenditures provided evidence of lower compliance of private hospi-
tals with provision of free medicines and diagnostics. Unless this is
monitored and controlled, enabling access to private facilities risks
resulting in higher OOP expenditure than would otherwise be the case.
The study cannot provide a definitive answer as to whether RSBY as
a PPP mechanism has been overwhelmingly effective in improving
access to hospitalization for the poor. Among the study's limitations is
that it is not possible to show the extent to which insurance firms took
profits from the scheme. We also cannot demonstrate that RSBY was
associated with significant patient expenditure with the rigour that
would be obtained, for example, in an impact evaluation study.
Although the current study showed that not all mandated services were
being offered, it could not demonstrate whether or not RSBY bene-
ficiaries could access all needed services. Many of the flaws in RSBY
would be predicted from a PPP arrangement under a weak regulatory
and administrative system, notably non-compliance with contract terms
on provision of services including failure to provide all required ser-
vices free-of-charge, as indicated by the fact that payment for services
was not at all uncommon even with insurance.
5. Conclusions and recommendations
RSBY was based on a PPP model governed through a series of
contracts which enabled the poor to access private health services, even
if compliance with contractual terms was poor.
An OECD review that examined policies and institutions that un-
derpin supervision of quality in healthcare, using Mexico as a case
study, suggests regulatory authority needs to be strong and independent
of ministerial power (OECD, 2016). Before implementing more com-
prehensive health insurance, Colombia extensively restructured its
delivery system to impose standards for healthcare providers (Glassman
et al., 2009). In contrast, there was no strong, best practice institutional
framework to guide the RSBY implementation process. RSBY's PPP
framework and implementing mechanisms lacked a sufficiently strong
regulatory environment with implications of weak governance and
monitoring processes and consequences for expansion of care, provider
compliance and user satisfaction. The fact that private service providers
participated in the RSBY scheme, and that the scheme grew very rapidly
to cover about 150 million beneficiaries, indicates that in many ways it
was a successful public service model. However, there were indeed
weaknesses in coverage of the BPL population, accessibility and avail-
ability of care, and compliance with scheme rules. Some of these were
inherent problems with the scheme, such as achieving high enrolment
of beneficiaries within a voluntary scheme and ensuring accessibility of
care when hospitals clustered in urban areas; others were likely results
of weak regulation and monitoring, such as non-compliance with re-
quirements on free care.
A number of recommendations can be made to seek to seek to tackle
the weaknesses.
• Greater supervision of both enrolment and empanelment should be
provided by government. A conscious effort needs to be made to
empanel more hospitals while ensuring quality of services.
• Engaging the private sector brought advantages, but stricter mon-
itoring is required of all hospitals providing services.
• Regular medical and social audits of providers should be conducted,
and sanctions imposed on providers who do not comply with con-
tract terms. Ensuring that users are not exposed to cash payments for
services which should have been free is an imperative.
• Greater modification of contracts at state, and if necessary, district
level should be encouraged to meet the requirements of local con-
ditions; this may require states to commit additional administrative
manpower and support further capacity development.
• A strong monitoring and evaluation framework and plan needs to be
incorporated in the contract design with a separate budget and
dedicated human resources. Third party monitoring could be helpful
and might bring significant improvements.
• Further thought needs to be given to the appropriate allocation of
responsibility within the state government.
All these recommendations are relevant not just to RSBY, but also to
the PPP framework adopted in Ayushman Bharat Yojana into which
RSBY has been subsumed.
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Annex
Table A1
Proportion of enrolled beneficiaries in RSBY Scheme in Patiala districta.
Under-5 5–14 yrs 15–24 yrs 25–44 yrs 45–64 yrs > 64 yrs Total
Total population Male 1,101,207 188,359 187,462 299,791 164,773 62,894 2,004,486
Female 975,969 147,421 161,995 283,727 158,504 58,282 1,785,898
Eligible population (BPL) Male 9,200 50,013 18,785 26,349 11,787 6,219 122,353
Female 9,400 49,880 18,802 26,420 11,758 6,227 122,487
Enrolled population Male 184 3,601 3,156 6,403 4,102 1,984 19,430
Female 235 2,494 3,140 7,292 4,292 1,395 18,848
% enrolled of eligible population Male 2.0% 7.2% 16.8% 24.3% 34.8% 31.9% 0.159
Female 2.5% 5.0% 16.7% 27.6% 36.5% 22.4% 0.154
All 2.25% 6.10% 16.75% 25.95% 35.65% 27.15% 0.156
a Similar data for Yamunanagar district were not available.
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Table A2
Reimbursed and Claimed amounts.
District → Reimbursed Claimed
Patiala Yamunanagara Patiala Yamunanagara
No of claims 992 5,903 992 5,903
Mean value (INR) 4,210 5,138 8,344 5,140
Std. deviation 3,992 4,175 6,520 4,175
P value <0.01 < 0.01
Mean amount reimbursed by the insurance company to the hospital (private vs public)
Hospital type → Patiala Yamunanagar Both districts consolidated
Private Public Private Public Privateb Publicc
No of claims 669 323 5,538 365 6,207 688
Mean value (INR) 3,708 5,250 5,140 5,105 4,985 5,173
SD 3,793 4,193 4,164 4,339 4,150 4,269
Difference <0.01 <0.01 0.39
Mean amount claimed from the insurance company by the hospitals (Private vs public)
Hospital type → Patiala Yamunanagar Both districts consolidated
Private Public Private Public Private Public
No of claims 669 323 5,538 365 6,207 688
Mean value (INR) 8,159 8,724 5,143 5,105 5,468 6,804
SD 6,532 6,487 4,165 4,339 4,577 5,742
P Value 0.287 <0.01 < 0.01
a 140 claims were rejected in Yamunanagar district.
b 120 claims from private hospitals were rejected.
c 20 claims from public hospitals were rejected.
Fig. A1. Exit interview sample size.
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